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MODERN ESCHEAT STATUTES DEALING
WITH UNCLAIMED INTANGIBLE
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Originally escheat applied only to real property,1 but modern
escheat statutes2 have not distinguished this term from bona
vacantia8 which applied only to personal property. Tangible per-
sonal property and real property have only one situs which is within
the state where the property is physically located and that state
alone has jurisdiction to escheat the property based on its physical
power over the property. 4 Because of the possibility of a plentiful
source of non-tax revenue,5 many states have adopted statutes
enabling them to escheat abandoned intangible personal property.6
This has caused a controversy over which state shall succeed in
escheating property when more than one state has an interest in
the intangible property. Because it is impossible to determine a
geographical situs and the situs of intangible property is not the
same for all purposesJ the states have based their escheat power
on different theories. In cases of unclaimed property held by cor-
porations, the state of incorporation,8 the state where the corpora-
tion has its principal office,9 a state having the most "contacts", 0
and the state of the creditor's last known address11 have all attempt-
ed at different times to escheat the property.
MULTIPLE CLAIMS AND COURT SOLUTION
In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey2 the state of New Jersey
was allowed to escheat unclaimed dividends and shares of stock.
1. E.g., Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944) ; In Re Melrose Ave.,
234 N.Y. 48, 136 N.E. 235 (1922).
2. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-502 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-10 (1960)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.08.020 (1963).
3. See, Origins and Developments of Modern Escheat, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1319 (1961).
4. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
5. Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1962, p 1, col. 1.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.010 (1962); CA.. ANN. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1500-27 (Supp.
1965): IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-501 to -530 (Supp. 1965) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 141, 88 101-30
(Smith-Hurd 1964) ; KY. REV. STAT. §§ 393.010 - .990 (1962) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-22-t
to -29 (Supp. 1965) ; N. D. CENT. CODE §§ 30-25-01 to 07, 54-01-01 to 02.3, 56-01-14 (1960),
6-08-24.1 (Supp. 1963) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 63.28.070 - .920 (1961) ; Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9-687,-688 (1957).
7. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951) ; Estin V. Estin, 334 U.S.
541 (1948) ; Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minn., 280, U.S. 204 (1930) ; Severnoe Secur-
ities Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 174 N.E. 299 (1931).
8. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1950); Anderson Nat]. Bank v.
Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944) ; Security Savings Bank v. People of State of Calif., 263
U.S. 282 (1923).
9. Texas v. New Jersey, supra note 4, at 680.
10. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Columbia
Broadcasing System Inc. v. Atkinson, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960, Cert. denied, 357 U.S.
569 (1958).
11. Texas v. New Jersey, supra note 4; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knight, 210 F.
Supp. 78 (S.D. Ill. 1962).
12. 341 U.S. 428 (1950).
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Standard Oil Co. was incorporated, but had no office or place of
business in the state of New Jersey except for a statutory registered
office. The stocks and dividends were issued and held in other
states and the last known addresses of the owners were chiefly in
other states. In allowing the state of incorporation of the debtor
to escheat the property, the Court said that the full faith and credit
clause bars any double escheat and that a valid judgment would
bar and thereby protect Standard Oil Co. from multiple claims by
missing shareholders.s The Court in handing down this decision
did not really attempt to decide as between states who had the
right to escheat intangible property as no other state was making
a claim to the property involved in this case. 14 Thus, the decision
as to conflicting claims between states was left for a later decision.
In the dissenting opinion Justice Frankfurter assessed this prob-
lem and the probable effect of the principal case by stating that:
"The constitution ought not to be placed in an unseemly light by
suggesting that the constitutional rights of the several states depend
on, and are terminated by, a race of diligence."' 15 As it was held in
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Comm. of Pennsylvania6 that the same
property cannot be constitutionally escheated by more than one
state, it would indeed seem that the first state to escheat the property
in question would be the successful state.
In the Western Union case the property involved was unclaimed
money orders bought in Pennsylvania from the New York corpora-
tion. The Court held that Pennsylvania had no power to render a
judgment of escheat which would bar New York or any other state
from escheating the same property 17 and said that this problem
would have to be settled by the states in an action under the
Court's original jurisdiction.1 8
In earlier decisions it had been argued that the state having the
most "contacts" with the debt should be allowed to escheat the
property. 9 This concept would not only involve the problem of
establishing a situs for the intangible property, but it would also
require "contacts" to be defined and the degree of "contacts" would
have to be compared.
In Texas v. New Jersey,20 Pennsylvania, the state where the
debtor had their principal offices, claimed the right to escheat the
abandoned property since the debtor had probably benefited most
by this state's laws and economy. This case involved claims by
states representing each of the theories and was brought under
13. Id. at 442, 443.
14. Id. at 443.
15. Id. at 444.
16. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
17. Id. at 76, 77.
18. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 2.
19. Cf. supra note 10.
20. Supra note 4.
442
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the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to finally settle the claim
between the states. Sun Oil Co., a New Jersey Corporation with its
principal offices in Pennsylvania, held small debts totalling $26,461.65
which it owed for periods from seven to 40 years to 1,730 small
creditors who never claimed the funds. Florida as well as Pennsyl-
vania, Texas and New Jersey made claims to the funds as some
of the creditors' last known addresses were in Florida. New Jersey
claimed as the state of incorporation, and Texas claimed as the
debts were evidenced on the books of Sun Oil Co. offices in Texas.
The Court held that only the state of the creditor's last known
address, as shown by the debtor's records, may claim an abandoned
obligation through the process of escheat.
2 1
In deciding this original suit the Court was looking for a workable
standard for "ease of administration and equity." 22 The Court felt
that to allow the state where the firm's principal offices are located
to escheat the intangible property would be to turn a debt into an
asset. Also they felt this would not be a workable rule as the
question of where the main office is located would result in disputes
over a question of fact.
In not allowing New Jersey, the state of Sun's incorporation,
to escheat the property the Court said ". . . and it seems to us that
in deciding a question which should be determined primarily on
principles of fairness, it would too greatly exhalt a minor factor to
permit escheat of obligations incurred all over the country by the
state in which the debtor happened to incorporate itself.
'2
3
In deciding in favor of the state of the creditor's last known
address as shown by the debtor's books and records, the Court
has attempted to set down a rule which will serve in all factual
situations. It should also be noted this rule would give no special
advantage to a state whose liberal incorporation laws are attractive
to promotors of incorporations. This decision is in accord with the
Restatement's view as to which state should receive intangibles
where the deceased is domiciled in a state other than where the
intangibles are held.
2 4
The Court also settled two other questions. They were who
would escheat property (1) where there was no record of address
and (2) where the last known address is in a state which does not
provide for escheat of the property in question. The Court stated
that in both situations the state of the corporate domicile could
escheat provided they hold the property so that the proper state
could later escheat if an address was found or if a proper law was
21. Id. at 681.
22. Id. at 683.
23. Id. at 680.
24. "In the absence of any Person who, according to the law of the state determining
the distribution of moveables, is entitled to succeed thereto, the chattels of an Intestate
and the proceeds of claims owned by him pass to the state In which they are adminis-
tered." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309.
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enacted.25 This form of statute would be custodial in nature as
opposed to the regular form of escheat statutes. In the case of an
escheat statute, title vests immediately in the state and the rights
of any previous owners are cut off.28 With the custodial type statute,
the state holds the property in its custody until subsequently claimed
by a rightful owner. 2
7
THE UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTYS
The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act which has
been adopted in twelve states28 was drafted by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners in 1954 and seems to have been drafted
most favorably in two areas. The Act is custodial in nature and
attempts to solve the problem of multiple claims.2 9 The Act adopts
the view that if the state of a creditor's last known address has
escheat laws that state should have priority in escheating the prop-
erty.30 Otherwise another state may escheat the property and hold
it for the state of the creditor's last known address.3' The procedure
is similar to the rule set down in Texas v. New Jersey. 2
The scope of the property and holders reached by states adopting
the Uniform Act is indicated by reference to sections two through
nine of the Uniform Act. Section two provides for the reporting
of dormant, inactive, and unclaimed accounts, dividends, checks,
and other funds held by banking or financial organizations. The
remaining sections apply to (a) unclaimed funds held by life insur-
ance companies, 83 (b) deposits and refunds held by utilities,34 (c)
undistributed dividends and distributions of business associations, 5
(d) property held in the course of dissolution by business associations
and banking or financial organizations, 38 (e) property held by fiduci-
aries, 7 and (f) property held by state courts and public officers.38
A provision is also provided to cover all other persons holding un-
claimed property which they accumulated in the ordinary course
of their business.3 9
In each case the property is declared abandoned if after seven
years the property is unclaimed, if the owner is not known, or if it
25. Texas v. New Jersey, supra note 4, at 682.
26. E.g., Semrad v. Semrad, 170 Neb. 911, 104 N.W.2d 338 (1960); Delaney v. State,
42 N.D. 630, 174 N.W. 290 (1919).
27. UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT (hereinafter cited as U.D.U.-
P.A.) §§ 14, 19.
28. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-351 to 44-378 (1956); CAL. ANN. CODE CIV. PROC. 9
1500'-27 (Supp. 1965); FLA. STAT. §4 717.01-717.30 (1963) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-501 to
14-530 (Supp. 1965); 'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 141 §§ 101-30 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 67-2201 to 67-2230 (Supp. 1965) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-22-1 to -29 (Supp.
1965) ; ORE. STAT. §9 98,302-98.436 (Supp. 1963) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-44-1 to 78-44-29
(Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 §§ 1208-1236 (Supp. 1965): VA. CODE ANN. 55-210.1
to 55-210.29 (Supp. 1965) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 63.28.070-63.28.920 (1961).
29. U.D.U.P.A. § 10.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
33. U.D.U.P.A. § 3.
34. U.D.U.P.A. § 4.
35. U.D.U.P.A. § 5.
36. U.D.U.P.A. § 6.
37. U.D.U.P.A. § 7.
38. U.D.U.P.A. § 8.
39. U.D.U.P.A. § 9.
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remains inactive. The holder is then required to report that the
property is abandoned and turn it over to the state treasurer. 0 It
was held in Metropolitan Insurance Co. v. Knight 1 that provisions
similar to the Uniform Act requiring reporting and depositing of the
property with the state were unconstitutional as applying to property
held by a New York insurance company doing business in Illinois
because the Act 42 contained no provisions for reimbursing the holder
if he were compelled to pay twice. The Illinois Act was amended
in 196343 to remedy this situation, but since the Texas case44 the
Uniform Act would seem satisfactory as it stands.
The Uniform Act further provides that the running of a statute
of limitations shall not prevent money or property from being pre-
sumed abandoned property nor affect the duty to report or deliver
the property to the state treasurer. 45 Some courts have held that
the defense of a statute of limitations creates a vested right and in
that case it cannot be taken away by the Uniform Act.46 Each
state should consider its own law and determine if their statute
of limitations may be lifted. This problem may be circumvented
by revising Section 16 of the Uniform Act so that the period
required to run is shorter than the period of limitation.47 It should
also be noted that in many cases.the running of the statute of
limitation will not be a problem because it may not run against
a fiduciary'" or a demand may be required to be made before
the statute begins to run. 9 Furthermore many statutes may not
run during the period of inactivity which is required for the property
to become abandoned. The states also have the choice of making
the statute a defense to any action.5
Two alternatives would seem to be open for the states. Federal
legislation 51 might establish uniform escheat laws, but this will
probably not come about as many states have adopted proper legis-
lation 52 and court decisions such as the Texas case defines well the
requirements for proper legislation. The second alternative would
be for the states to adopt the Uniform Disposition of Abandoned
40. U.D.U.P.A. § 11.
41. 210 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Ill. 1962).
42. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 141, §§ 101-130 (Smlth-Hurd 1964).
43. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 141, §§ 114 & 118 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
44. Texas v. New Jersey, supra note 32.
45. U.D.U.P.A. § 16.
46. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373, 79 N.W. 433 (1899); McCracken
County v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344, 1 S.W. 585 (1886). By the great weight of
authority, so far as concerns the title to real property or personal property, the bar of
the statute cannot be removed by the legislature. This may not be true for actions in tort.
See Campell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) which holds that the legislature had the power
to remove the bar of the statute of limitations, distinguishing actions relating to the title
to real or personal property.
47. N.J. Rirv. STAT. §§ 2A:37-29 to -44 (1952), New Jersey provides that property will
be declared abandoned after five years and will be delivered to the custody of the state
which will escheat the property after two years of custody. Thus a statute of limitations
with a period of five years or more will not be a defense to an escheat action.
48. State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950).
49. U.C.C. § 3-122 (2).
50. Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.100 (1949).
51. See "Federal Act to Resolve Conflicting State Claims to Abandoned Property", 1
Harv. J. on Legislation 51.
52. S upra note 28.
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Property Act as its characteristics best fit the requirements of
cases involving abandoned intangible property.
NORTH DAKOTA'S ESCHEAT STATUTES
It is desirable for North Dakota to assess its escheat statutes
and modify them to take advantage of this source of non-tax revenue.
At present, North Dakota has laws to escheat property, real or
personal, which is within the state. 3 Chapter 30-25 of the North
Dakota code provides for the escheat and vesting in the state title
to all property which is owned by an intestate and if no person can
be found to succeed to the property. A period of six years is provided
before title vests in the state, and proper procedure is provided for
the escheat proceedings.5 4 North Dakota has also provided that
personal property situated in North Dakota will follow its owner
and is governed by the law of his domicile.5 5 In the case of In Re
Nolan56 California attempted to escheat intangible property left in
the state by a person who died domiciled in Montana without heirs.
California had adopted the statute that the property was to follow
the owner.5 7 In reversing a decree of escheat of the personalty to
the state of California, the appellate court held that, assuming
without deciding that the situs of the property was in California,
the general escheat provisions of California law did not purport to
deal with the personal property of non-residents; and the distribution,
under the above statute, would be governed by the law of Montana.5 8
This decision combined with the decision of the Texas case 59 clearly
shows that North Dakota could not attempt to escheat a deceased
non-resident's intangibles found in the state.
Section 54-01-02 is inadequate as relating to abandoned property
found in the state because there is no enabling law empowering the
state to meet due process requirements in escheating property. In
comparing this section with the statute enabling the state to escheat
where there are no heirs,6 0 it would seem that 54-01-02 is lacking
because it does not provide for an action by the Attorney General
which is required to vest the title of unowned property in the state."
There is a total absence of any laws allowing the state to escheat
abandoned or unclaimed personal property located outside the state
which might have at one time belonged to a person whose last known
address was in North Dakota.
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-01-02 (1960).
54. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30-25-01 to - 13 (1960).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-07-01 (1960).
56. 135 Cal. App.2d 16, 286 P.2d 899 (1955): 50 A.L.R.2d 1369.
57. CAL. ANN. CODE Civ. PROC. § 946 (1954).
58. In Re Nolan, supra, note 56, at 902; The RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW §
309 states that in absence of any person who, according to the law of the state determin-
ing the distribution of moveables, is entitled to succeed thereto, the goods, tangible or in-
tangible, of an intestate pass to the state in which they are administered.
59. Texas v. New Jersey, supra note 32.
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-14 (1960).
61. Delaney v. State, 42 N.D. 630, 174 N.W. 290 (1919). This case holds that the state
does not take title by succession or as last heir, but an escheat action is required to vest
title in the state.
NOTES
It should also be noted that if any act is adopted in the future,
it would have to comply with section 153 of the North Dakota
Constitution. This section provides that all escheated property shall
be credited to the permanent school fund. It is provided that property
escheating to the state because of lack of heirs will be placed in
the common school fund,62 but in other instances statutes provide
that escheating funds be used in other ways.63 There is little doubt
that those escheat statutes which do not provide that the escheated
property be credited to the permanent school fund are unconstitu-
tional.
CONCLUSION:
North Dakota's escheat statutes need supplementing to provide
for the escheating of intangible personal property not located in
North Dakota. The escheat statutes now existing would not neces-
sarily have to be revised as they apply to real and personal property
located in North Dakota. The statutes covering intangible personal
property should be in detail to give notice to persons and organi-
zations who might be holding unclaimed property if they are to be
required to report such property to the state. Certain administrative
details must be solved such as what state office will handle the
funds and an account would have to be established for the possibility
of recovery where a person desires to recover unclaimed property.
It would seem that the Uniform Act was a model established with
much foresight, and any legislation should follow this model.
EDMOND REES
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-18 (Supp. 1965).
63. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 6-08-24.1 (Supp. 1963), 37-15-16 & 17, 36-22-08,54-01-02.3
(1960). Each statute provides that money from property passing to the state will be placed
in funds other than the common school fund.
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